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In a beautifully written, cogently argued
paper MacDonald (2013), presents the
theoretical framework that guides one of
the most creative and influential research
programs in the language sciences. The
PDC began with empirical demonstra-
tions that readers are remarkably sen-
sitive to distributional patterns in the
input. These empirical demonstrations
were accompanied by theoretical argu-
ments that ambiguity resolution can be
modeled by constraint-based (probabilis-
tic) systems that learn these patterns
from experience (also see Tanenhaus and
Trueswell, 1995; Tabor et al., 1997). This
research was part of a wave of research
in the 1990’s that answered long-standing
questions in real-time language compre-
hension and early language acquisition,
with variations of “It’s the input, stupid”
(e.g., Saffran, Aslin, and Newport’s sem-
inal work on statistical learning, Saffran
et al., 1996).
The probabilistic constraints that com-
prehenders learn and use must arise from
the output created by speakers and writers.
But why does that output exhibit sys-
tematic patterns both within and across
language? One answer is that languages
maximize learnability for the child. A sec-
ond is that speaking and more generally
the structure of language is shaped by con-
siderations of communicative efficiency
(see Jaeger’s commentary). MacDonald
proposes a production-based answer.
Grounding her arguments in insights
from the motor planning and control lit-
erature, MacDonald makes a convincing
case that that constraints on planning
processes in language production play an
important role in shaping the form of
utterances. She argues that the demands
of memory retrieval, planning, and lin-
earization for sequential behavior that
requires a hierarchical control structure
play the central role both in determin-
ing the forms that speakers use to convey
their intentions and, as a consequence,
the patterns of linguistic forms that are
observed both within and across lan-
guages. These arguments are supported
by a clear exposition of principles and a
summary of some elegant experiments
focusing on the production of relative
clauses.
Less convincing is MacDonald’s argu-
ment that these production constraints
comprise most of the story. Here is the
cartoon view of the assumptions that
underlie this claim. Speaking is extremely
hard while understanding is comparatively
easy. It is costly for speakers to take into
account the listener, especially at the tem-
poral grain required for influencing the
planning process in production. Listeners,
however, are really good at learning prob-
abilistic constraints, making use of con-
text, and adapting to speakers. Given these
considerations it makes sense for speak-
ers (and languages) to promote forms that
make speaking easier.
In this commentary, I raise question
about some of the assumption that under-
lie the claim that production demands—in
particular planning and linearization—are
most of the story. I begin by noting some
parallels with earlier arguments that were
based on assumptions about the difficulty
of comprehension. I note that much of
what we know about how naturally listen-
ers use context, emerged only when psy-
cholinguists began to examine language
comprehension in richer contexts and
more natural interactive tasks. I suggest
that we actually don’t know much about
how speakers might adapt to addressees
in real-time language production. There is
a paucity of research that examines pro-
duction in those interactive environments
where addressees provide feedback. When
production is examined in interactive set-
tings, there is tantalizing evidence that
speakers do, in fact, monitor addressees,
and might adapt on the fly.
IS SPEAKING IS MUCH HARDER THAN
UNDERSTANDING?
A conservative answer is that we really
don’t know. The answer likely depends
on the metric used to quantify and com-
pare difficulty. When we examine the task
that the listener faces, it seems daunt-
ing. The listener must infer speaker inten-
tions from a transient series of acoustic
events. By analogy, imagine reading text
without spaces as it passes through a two-
letter aperture at a variable rate which
you do not control, and with some of
the features of the letters arriving asyn-
chronously. In fact, after Marslen-Wilson’s
classic, and at the time surprising, stud-
ies demonstrating the remarkable speed of
real time spoken language comprehension
(Marslen-Wilson, 1973, 1975), psycholin-
guists wondered how such a complex task
could be performed so rapidly1.
My point is that we often make assump-
tions that a (seemingly) complex process
is hard without independent motivation.
To further illustrate this point, psycholin-
guists have assumed, and many still do,
that listeners do not take the perspec-
tive of the speaker into account in real-
time processing because doing so is too
resource demanding (e.g., Keysar et al.,
2000). Moreover, pragmatic inferences are
too slow and too costly to influence syn-
tactic processing (Clifton and Ferreira,
1989). Central to these arguments is
the intuition that pragmatic and simi-
lar processes are strategic, and that we
know that strategic processes are slow and
1The relentless and, in my opinion, often misguided
focus on what happens during the earliest moments
in language processing is a reflex of the assump-
tion that one-line spoken language processing is really
hard (Tanenhaus, 2004). Proposals about informa-
tion encapsulation were motivated, in part, by the
need to explain how word recognition and parsing
could occur so rapidly (Fodor, 1983). Moreover, the
demands of on-line processing motivated proposals
that languages follow principles that minimize the
real-time parsing difficulty (Hawkins, 1990, 1995).
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resource demanding (Posner and Snyder,
1975; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977).
RICH CONTEXT AND NATURAL TASKS
In studies of real-time comprehension
in more natural tasks, including inter-
active conversation, listeners are remark-
ably adept at rapidly doing things that
we previously assumed were slow and
costly. These include constructing refer-
ential domains on the fly, taking into
account action-based affordances, com-
puting implicatures, and modifying ref-
erential domains based on the speaker’s
knowledge and perceived intentions. In
fact, information provided by specific con-
text can override even strong expectations
based on distributional patterns that arise
from accumulated experience (for review
of some of this early work see Tanenhaus
and Brown-Schmidt, 2008). Space limits
preclude developing this argument, so I
will simply make the claim that many
demonstrations that listeners are egocen-
tric, inferences are costly, etc., fall by the
wayside when we begin to understand
how listeners (and speakers) construct and
restrict domains (for discussion see Degen
and Tanenhaus, under review).
DO SPEAKER’S MONITOR
ADDRESSEES DURING UTTERANCES
PLANNING AND PRODUCTION?
MacDonald suggests that whereas listeners
might be good at using context, adapt-
ing to speakers, etc., speakers find this
costly and therefore do not take the lis-
tener into account, at least at a fine-enough
temporal grain to influence planning. Do
speakers take into account real-time feed-
back from addressees and adapt on the
fly? The received view in the produc-
tion literature is that speakers do not.
But, I would argue that we really don’t
know the answer because most produc-
tion research does not use interlocutors
in natural tasks. One reason why listeners
might be so good at adapting to speak-
ers is that listeners can use an internal
model to generate expectations that cre-
ate an error signal as the speaker-generated
input is processed. This error signal can
drive learning accumulated over experi-
ence and also rapid adaptation (see Jaeger’s
commentary). In production, however, the
speaker can only adapt to the listener if she
provides an error signal that the speaker
can use.
Try this exercise. In a conversation
with an interlocutor, avoid giving the
speaker any feedback; don’t raise your
eyebrows, nod or say, “uh-huh,” “hmm,”
“ok,” and “really.” More often than not
the speaker will become hesitant and her
speech will become halting and disfluent.
Why? One plausible explanation is that
speakers monitor addressees for this kind
of feedback. Consider another example,
which my colleague, James Allen, uses to
argue for incremental generation systems
which incorporate feedback. You begin
to ask your partner to “Hand me the
Phillips tool. . . ” which is in a pile with
some screwdrivers. Noticing that he is con-
fused, youmight change your utterance, to
something more descriptive (e.g., “it looks
like, uh, a screwdriver with notches at
the end. . . ”) and subsequently use descrip-
tive terms for less common tools. Most
production experiments, however, do not
create the opportunity for feedback. In
the few experiments where feedback is
available (Snedeker and Trueswell, 2003;
Clark and Krych, 2004; Roche et al.,
under review) speakers do in fact adjust
their utterances (For other examples, see
Brennan and Hanna, 2009).
A different type of evidence that speak-
ers might take into account the perspective
of their addressees during utterance plan-
ning comes from recent research on use
of referring expressions. Wu and Keysar
(2007) introduced a paradigm in which
pairs of naïve participants together learn
some novel names for novel shapes (Wu
and Keysar, 2007). One partner, who is
subsequently the director in a referen-
tial communication task, then learns some
new (privileged) names.When the director
instructs the matcher to click on a tar-
get shape, the simple, name-alone form
is only used for shared names. For priv-
ileged names, speakers use descriptions,
which are far more complex (Heller et al.,
2012; Gorman et al., 2013). When direc-
tors do use a name for a privileged shape,
two things happen: the name is imme-
diately followed by a description and the
name is realized prosodically in such a way
the listeners can reliably tell that further
information is following the name (com-
pared to productions of shared names). If
we assume absence of perspective taking
in production, this is a surprising result.
Perhaps this is the exception that proves
the rule because shared experience makes
the speaker-specific information immedi-
ately available when a name is retrieved.
This is certainly a possibility. However,
another possibility is that speakers actively
tailor aspects of their utterances to con-
vey or assess likely common ground. The
following exercise that suggests that speak-
ers are sensitive to at least some types of
feedback.
This exercise requires you and two
other participants, all of whom know that
one of the participants is an expert on
Topic A. Speakers generally ask informa-
tion questions when they don’t already
know the answer, and they direct those
questions to people who they expect to
have the relevant knowledge (indeed lis-
teners rapidly use this information to
disambiguate potential referents, Brown-
Schmidt et al., 2008). Address a question
about the expert’s bailiwick to the person
with less expertise and observe the reac-
tion of both parties. Examples like this
raise the possibility that speakers some-
times provide specific information in a bid
to assess a listener’s likely knowledge, and
to correct an interlocutor who isn’t appro-
priately calibrated. In addition, interlocu-
tors may mark and track who can be
taken as the source of information. If A
tells B that Harry is in the hospital, B
might answer, “Oh, really,” but not “Yes,
really.” “Yes,” conveys independent knowl-
edge, whereas “Oh,” does not (Gunlogson,
2008). We don’t know that speakers track
this information and if they do, how it
might affect utterance planning. However,
the fact that interactive conversation con-
tains many linguistic devices that signal
knowledge state and intention suggests
that examining these phenomena might
change our ideas about what information
sources speakers attend to in much the
same way that our perspective on language
understanding has been affected by similar
experiments.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I am not challenging
MacDonald’s persuasive arguments that
the form of utterances, and language
itself is strongly influenced by memory
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and planning constraints. Neither am I
challenging the claim that production
might be harder than comprehension, nor
suggesting that incorporation of real-time
feedback plays the same role in produc-
tion as it does in comprehension. What
I am arguing, however, is that, as was
the case for language comprehension, we
won’t know until we ask the relevant ques-
tions in interactive environments that pro-
vide feedback that speakersmight ormight
not use. Otherwise, we are likely to under-
estimate what speakers can do on the fly,
much as we once underestimated what lis-
teners can do.
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